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We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment.  Subjects 
are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment, and then 
reminded during each of 25 periods of its declining new value. We observe price bubbles 
forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old 
generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market 
creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset.  This finding is 
significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and, 
consistent with previous cross-subject comparisons, shows how fluctuations in market liquidity 
influence price paths.  We also find that trading experience leads to price expectations that 
incorporate fundamental value.       
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1. Introduction 
Markets are a critical feature of national economies. Market prices serve as signals, coordinating 
the activities of dispersed individuals. (Hayek 1945). Markets are theoretically rational if prices 
reflect all available information as posited in standard economic and finance theory (Muth 1961).  
This property has long been supported empirically in experimental supply and demand markets 
for flows of commodity where each unit transacted realizes an immediate current surplus for 
each agent identified in the transaction.1  
However, there are many instances where asset market prices have become unhinged from the 
underlying value of the asset being traded, sometimes for extended periods, often with negative 
effects that ripple through the broader economy when the market corrects.  The housing market 
collapse beginning in 2007 has led to a severe negative equity condition for households, and, 
since the banks hold mortgage claims on homes, the banks also suffer from the same condition. 
Naturally occurring markets, however, offer limited ability to study price bubbles.  In part this is 
because an asset’s fundamental value is not normally objectively verifiable and thus, empirical 
work that compares prices to some estimated value necessarily represents a joint test of efficient 
markets and the accuracy of the estimated “true” value.2  Similarly, it is difficult to determine if 
price movements are due to real or fundamental changes in information or not.   
As discovered initially in Suchanek, Smith, and Williams (1988; hereafter SSW), the laboratory 
can provide a replicable environment in which to study market behavior and explore factors that 
lead to the formation and collapse of asset prices. In SSW subjects were endowed with cash and 
shares receiving dividend realizations from a common information distribution in each of a 
known number of periods. As in rational expectations theory the fundamental value of shares in 
any period is simply the expected value of the remaining dividend payments.  Hence, 
fundamental value declines monotonically over time.3  There are hundreds of laboratory 
experiments replicating and extending the results of SSW. With inexperienced traders, prices 
grow relative to fundamental value creating a bubble followed by a collapse as the endpoint of 
                                                            
1 Such markets converge in minutes.  See Smith (1962) and Holt (1995) for a comprehensive survey.  
2 An exception is to be found in closed-end stock funds where large bubbles have sometimes occurred; the Spain and 
Iberian funds are examples. See Porter and Smith (2003).  
3 See Noussair, et al. (2001) and Noussair and Powell (2001) for discussions of asset market experiments with non-
standard fundamental value paths.   
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the trading horizon is approached.  That is, a single bubble is commonly observed. With 
additional experience bubbles become progressively less pronounced, and approach fundamental 
value.  As explained below, however, recent studies have greatly illuminated the economic 
conditions that account for these bubbles, and established that instructional treatments that focus 
on subject comprehension can substitute for experience in moderating or extinguishing these 
bubble tendencies.    
One shortcoming of the standard asset market experiments is that the lives of the traders and the 
assets are identical, and that other market conditions such as the initial amount of liquidity in the 
system or the inflow of new liquidity (cash dividends) is fixed.  Thus, studies that have examined 
the effects of liquidity have largely emphasized using across-subjects market comparisons. This 
paper extends the experimental asset market literature by varying market conditions within the 
trading horizon while otherwise maintaining the structure common to that literature. Specifically, 
this paper presents the results of asset market experiments where traders enter and exit the 
market within the longer life of the traded asset.  Entry is associated with bubble formation as the 
market absorbs the increased liquidity.  Exit is associated with bubble collapse as traders remove 
money.  The cycling of trading generations leads to a pattern of bubble formation, collapse, and 
reformation within the continuous trading life of the asset.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two provides a detailed review of 
the asset market literature and section three describes our experimental design.  The results are 
presented in section four and a final section offers concluding remarks.       
2. Background Literature 
In the canonical asset market environment, with complete probabilistic information and declining 
fundamental value, experience in three separate sessions with the same subjects has been 
identified as the one reliable treatment that yields convergence toward the predicted rational 
expectations equilibrium. (Sunder, 1995: Porter and Smith, 2003) The conclusions of SSW were 
that: (1) the results were entirely consistent with rational expectations as an equilibrium concept; 
(2) but complete common information was not alone sufficient to yield equilibrium except 
through an experiential learning process in which people come to have common rational 
expectations with experience (SSW, pp 1148, 1150). This conclusion has been modified by the 
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work of Lei, et al. (2001). They report experiments in the SSW environment with inexperienced 
subjects wherein buyers (endowed with cash) can only buy against dividend value, and sellers 
(endowed with shares) can only sell shares. Contract prices persist in varying degrees above 
fundamental dividend value in all three of the sessions reported, showing that buyers violate 
individual rationality, and that the phenomena of conscious rational speculation—buy low in 
expectation of capital gains, then sell high—is not necessary for such mispricing to occur with 
inexperienced subjects.4 This contribution implies that experience across three sessions in SSW 
accomplishes rather more than creating common expectations: in the process it also eliminates or 
corrects initial violations of individual rationality by inexperienced subjects.               
Various treatment conditions have been identified that reduce or eliminate mispricing and 
bubbles within the same general instructional treatments:  
(1) Smith et al, (2000) find that when a single dividend realization is paid on terminal share 
holdings, bubbles are essentially eliminated. Hence, with trader attention refocused on end-of-
horizon realizations and away from myopic period-by-period realizations, trader behavior 
changes dramatically from the bubble behavior reported by SSW (also see Noussair, et al. 2001 
and Noussair and Powell 2010 who further extend the investigation of the timing of asset return 
realizations.)  Caginalp et al. (1998) had shown that bubbles were larger if initial cash to asset 
value ratios are increased, but Krebler et al. (2011) perceptively observe that when incoming 
dividends are realized each period in an environment of declining asset FV, the ratio of cash to 
asset value escalates throughout the experiment. Hence, in comparison with SSW a second 
important condition in Smith et al, (2000) is being changed simultaneously: when all dividends 
are realized at the end of the horizon, rather than at the end of each period, it removes the flow of 
incoming cash to fuel momentum trading sentiment.5 These informative results may also help to 
explain why information asset trading markets in the field tend not to bubble like those in SSW 
environments. Information markets are designed to predict a wide array of future events such as 
                                                            
4 Similar wholesale violations of individual rationality were evident in the recent housing-mortgage market bubble. 
Thus, in 2005, 45% of first time borrowers paid no money down. (National Association of Realtors, 2006, Exhibit 5-
3). Hence, lenders were exposed asymmetrically to the entire risk of their loan in the event that prices turned down. 
If prices continued to rise the entire increase translated into equity for borrowers, who had an incentive to abandon 
the home if prices turned down.   
5 Indeed, Smith et al. (2000) also reported a series of experiments in which half of each dividend realization is paid 
at the end of each period, and half at the end of the experiment. The result is to produce more modest bubbles than in 
SSW showing clearly the importance of the rising ratio of cash to asset value emphasized by Kirchler, et al. (2011).     
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company sales (Chen and Plott 2002), the outcome of political elections (Berg, et al. 2008) and 
the popularity of movies (Pennock, et al. 2001). A characteristic feature of these markets is that 
they create asset claims on event-contingent outcomes realized at the end of a finite trading 
horizon.   
(2) Noussair and Tucker (2006) add a futures market to the SSW environment on each period 
ahead in addition to the current spot market in shares, and this also is quite effective in 
squelching bubbles in spot shares. As in (1) this important result may be interpreted as also 
requiring traders to focus on value (and actually produce corresponding prices) in future periods; 
moreover, it aids backward induction and reduces uncertainty about future behavior of others by 
allowing that behavior to be experienced simultaneously in the current period. It demonstrates 
what may be the most important role of futures markets: to give individuals advance information 
on traders’ own expectations of the future and aid the formation of common expectations.  
Several studies have focused on the use of instructions and other pre-experiment exercises 
(rather than only experience for given instructions as in SSW) to assess the effect of improved 
individual comprehension on group convergence to fundamental value: Kirchler et al. (2011) 
emphasize better subject understanding of the declining FV process as a means of greatly 
reducing bubbles; Lei and Vesely (2009) give subjects pre-experiment experience with the 
dividend process; Huber and Kirchler (2011) show that subjects perform better with training 
devices in which the declining FV process is exhibited in graphical rather than tabular form, or 
when subjects are administered a questionnaire that reward-motivates them to answer correctly 
each period what the FV is for that period. Graphical devices and incentives matter in teaching 
the economic principles of rationality that translate into better asset market performance.    
All these technical and aberrant conditions that exacerbate bubbles—higher cash to asset ratios, 
absence of a futures market, and sources of trader error, irrationality and misunderstanding of 
declining FV—are all corrected by three times experienced subjects in the SSW environment. 
The last decade of experimental research has been able to dissect the elements in that experience 
that better account for why experience works.      
3. Experimental Design 
Assets and Trading  
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In our economic environment shares last 25 periods and have a redemption value of zero at the 
end of the 25th period.  Following Hussam, et al. (2008), a dividend is paid each period and the 
amount is randomly drawn from {0, 8, 28, 60} in cents.  A total of 18 shares exist in the market 
and every share is paid the same dividend in a given period.  In actuality, one dividend stream 
was drawn and used in every experimental session.     
The fundamental value of a share in period t is  (26 t)cents since the expected dividend 
payment is 24 cents each period and dividends are paid at the end of the period.  Thus, before the 
first dividend is paid, a share of the asset is worth 600 cents.  The fundamental value then 
decreases by 24 cents with each passing period until the 25th period during which the value is 
only 24 cents.  This creates the familiar declining stair step pattern for fundamental value used in 
the vast majority of asset market experiments.      
During each trading period active traders can use cash to buy shares and/or sell shares for cash.  
Trading occurs via an electronic double auction market.  Active traders can post offers to sell 
shares assuming they currently own shares (i.e. short selling is not allowed).  Active traders can 
also post offers to buy shares assuming they have enough cash (i.e. borrowing is not allowed). 
New offers to buy and sell must improve upon existing offers, but displaced offers remain in the 
open bid book unless cancelled.6 At any point, an active trader can accept the current best offer 
to buy or sell.  Completed contracts are displayed graphically in chronological order. 
Trader Generations and Predicted Behavior  
There were 18 participants in the experiment, each assigned to one of three generations of 
traders.  A third of the subjects were randomly assigned membership in Generation 1, a third to 
Generation 2, and a third to Generation 3.  Traders in the same generation were indistinguishable 
from one another. Each member of Generation 1 was endowed with three shares and 1500 cents 
cash for a total expected portfolio value of  3 . Members of Generations 2 
                                                            
6 The effect of an open book, with all orders standing and visible to the participants, on asset trading behavior has 
not to our knowledge been studied in a double auction market.  We note that U.S. stock markets do not implement 
an open book. What is made public are the following: the most recent trade price, the standing best bid and ask, and 
the “stock ahead” (quantity offered) at the standing bid and ask prices. These items are all updated in real time as 
they change. We note also that SSW originally followed these information displays and trading rules.  Caginalp, et 
al. (1998) consider the effect of an open versus closed bid book with a call market institution and find that bubble 
amplitudes are dampened with an open book. 
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and 3 were endowed with 0 shares and 3300.  Cash holdings for Generation 1 were set such that 
the ratio of cash to fundamental value was 2.5, as in Hussam et al. (2008).   
Generation 1 traders were active, meaning members of that generation could buy and sell shares 
and receive dividends, in periods 1 through 10.  Generation 2 was active in periods 6 through 20 
and Generation 3 was active in periods 16 through 25.  With our overlapping generations 
framework, the market cycles through five-period sequences of a single generation trading and 
five period sequences in which two generations are trading.7  Each time a generation becomes 
active, new cash is brought into the market.  Each time a generation becomes inactive, cash is 
withdrawn from the market.   
Generation 3 faces a problem similar to that faced by subjects in standard asset markets as those 
people are trading assets they can hold until all dividends are paid.  However, Generation 2 faces 
a more complicated problem in that Generation 2 subjects have to anticipate what Generation 3 
will be willing to pay in period 20 when five dividend payments remain.  Generation 1 faces an 
even more difficult problem as they have to anticipate how much Generation 2 will be willing to 
pay for shares that will in turn be sold to Generation 3.   
Under standard assumptions, including common knowledge of the rationality of others, traders 
should be able to infer that the price in the last period will be 24, the expected value of a single 
period.  Working backwards the price would equal fundamental value every period.  As an 
alternative, myopic traders would only value the asset for the dividends they themselves could 
receive.  Under this assumption prices would decline within each five period increment, 
experiencing sizeable jumps or falls when new traders enter or exit respectively, but always 
remaining below fundamental value until period 21 at which point price would equal 
fundamental value.  A third alternative is suggested by Caginalp et al. (1998) and Kirchler et al. 
(2011) in which the entry and exit of traders increases and decreases the cash to asset FV ratio, 
causing prices to rise relative to fundamental value with entry and the converse occurring as 
                                                            
7 To maintain the number of shares in the active market, any shares held by a trader after he or she became inactive 
were automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0 and then resold by the experimenter in the next period at 
random intervals by accepting the highest offer to buy.  This process was explained to the subjects in the directions.   
Traders were also reminded of this in their penultimate active period.  On average 1.625 shares were purchased by 
the experimenters when a generation exited the market with 46% of these purchases occurring in Session 2 when 
Generation 2 stopped trading after period 20.     
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traders exit.  These considerations suggest that we would observe a bubble in periods 6-10 
followed by collapse in periods 11-15 followed by another bubble in periods 16-20 and a second 
collapse in periods 21-25.           
Price Forecasts 
While inactive, subjects were asked to forecast the average price in the next trading period.  At 
the end of the experiment one inactive period was selected for each generation.  Subjects 
received $10.00 if their price forecast was within 5% of the actual observed price in the selected 
period.  Answers that were within 10% of the actual price received $5.00 and predictions that 
were within 25% of the actual price received $2.50.    
Predictions were made during the summary time between periods.  While inactive traders could 
not observe market trading on their own screens, a market observer screen was projected at the 
front of the lab throughout the experiment.  The screen listed the bid book, graphed contracts, 
provided dividend realizations, showed the average price, and displayed messages about 
generations entering and exiting the market as well as the fundamental value.  This procedure 
also served to provide common information to all subjects and reinforced the commonality of 
dividends and the trading process information.     
Participants and Procedures 
A total of 72 subjects participated in the study, 18 unique people in each of the four replications.  
The experiments were conducted at the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the 
University of Arkansas.  Participants were all undergraduate students at the institution who had 
previously registered in the lab’s subject pool.  No subject had previously participated in any 
related experiments at the lab.  The experiment lasted two and half hours and subjects received a 
participation payment of $10 in addition to their salient earnings.  Because of the length of the 
experiment, all sessions were conducted in the evening.  The average total subject payment was 
$52.14.          
Upon arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned seats, which had privacy partitions.  
The directions were presented as a slide show at the front of the room and the text was read 
aloud by a researcher.  After the directions were finished and any questions had been answered, 
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subjects completed an online multiple response comprehension quiz. Three of the nine quiz 
questions addressed subject understanding of the dividend structure or the declining average 
value of dividends remaining to be paid per share; e.g., one question asked “During round 3 
trading, the average total future dividend payment for a Share would be;” another, asked “After 
the dividend following period 25 is paid, a Share is worth.” After the quiz, subjects learned of 
their own generation and the experiment began.   
At the end of each round of trading, traders are shown the realized dividend amount and 
summary information that includes the average price in the preceding period and (if active) the 
subject’s own holdings of shares and cash (inclusive of the dividend payment).  During trading, 
everyone is informed of the fundamental value of a share based on the expected dividend 
realization and the number of dividend realizations remaining. Specifically, the subjects are 
shown a statement on the screen such as “This is round 14.  The expected total future dividend 
payment is 24*12=288.” Consequently, subjects are not expected to hold in memory the 
declining FV process, on which their understanding had been tested at the end of the instructions.  
Each trading period lasted three minutes and the break between periods was approximately 30 
seconds. Trading was electronic via the Zocalo program while price forecasts were hand 
written.8 After the final dividend realization, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash 
and dismissed from the experiment.   
It is worth emphasizing that we are focusing on subjects who experience the market only once.   
Thus, our results are comparable to those of inexperienced subjects in asset market experiments.  
Based upon the entirety of the asset market literature, as well as data from other experiments 
where backwards induction is expected to play a role,9 we speculate that with sufficient 
repetition prices would approach fundamental value.  However, naturally occurring markets are 
not replayed with the same participants and it is this environment that we seek to capture in the 
laboratory as it is the domain where bubbles occur and policy is applicable. Similarly, and for the 
same reason we do not follow the procedures in the background literature above where 
                                                            
8 Copies of the directions, the quiz, and the price forecasting handouts are available from the authors upon request.  
The Zocalo software is available at zocalo.sourceforge.net.        
9 See for example, McCabe (1989) on the unraveling of fiat money with experience.  
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instructions and various pre-experiment training exercises are used as a treatment and shown to 
substitute for experience in reducing bubble formation.      
4. Experimental Results 
Figure 1 shows the price pattern relative to fundamental value for each session.  The main result 
is clear from this figure; three of the four sessions show a clear double bubble pattern consistent 
with the bubbles being driven by the influx of cash and the bursts being driven by cash being 
pulled out of the system.  In every session, shares trade well below fundamental value in the first 
five periods.  In three of the sessions (all except session 1) share prices are above fundamental 
value in period 6 when generation 2 enters the market and continue to climb in the 7th period.  
However, in all three sessions, by the 10th period, the last period in which generation 1 is active, 
the bubble is bursting and prices are falling.10  All four sessions experience a bubble in periods 
16-20.  Three of the sessions (all expect session 4) see prices near fundamental value by period 
20 with trading remaining relatively close to this level in the last five periods.  The second 
bubble in Session 4 inflated and burst more gradually than those of the other sessions, but even 
here the prices began to fall as generation 2 was exiting the market and the bubble had burst by 
the end of trading.      
Traditionally, asset market experiments have focused on the size and duration of a single bubble.  
To examine multiple bubbles, we need to delineate each episode.  We define a price trough to 
occur in period t when pt < pt+x for x {-4, -3, …, 4} where pt denotes the average price in 
period t.  We define a peak in the analogous way.11  In one instance (Session 4), this definition 
does not lead to a unique trough between the first and second peaks.  In this case we take the 
period with the lower price to be the trough.   All four sessions experience a trough in first five 
periods, followed by a peak occurring between periods 7 and 9, followed by a trough between 
periods 10 and 15, followed by another peak between periods 16 and 19 and a final trough in 
period 20.   
                                                            
10 Session 1 is relatively flat and prices remain below fundamental value until late in the session, but even in Session 
1 prices are higher in periods 6 through 9 than they were in period 5 and lower in period 10 than in any previous 
period.  Prices in periods 11 through 15 when only generation 2 is active are generally lower than in periods 6-10 
and periods 16-20 when two generations are active.   
11 For periods in which no trading occurred, a linear price trend was assumed to exist between the most recent 
average price observed and the next average price observed. 
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Figure 1.  Market Behavior by Session 
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respectively and bP  denoting the peak period.  Amplitude is maximum change in the difference 
between price and fundamental value. It is measured as max {(pt - Ft)/ܨ௕భ: t  B} – min {(pt - 
Ft)/ܨ௕భ: t  B} where Ft is the fundamental value of the asset in period t.  Duration is the length 
of time in periods that prices increase.  We provide two measures of Duration.  Trough to Peak 
Duration is simply the number of periods between the trough and the peak, that is bP-b1.  
Standard Duration as typically measured in asset market experiments is measured as max {m: pt - 
Ft < pt+1 - Ft+1< … < pt+m - Ft+m for t (b1, …, bP-1)}.  The former definition ignores fundamental 
value and does not require a monotonic increase.  Turnover measures trading activity in the 
market.  It is defined as ∑ ௧ܸ/ܵ௧∈஻  where S is the number of shares in the market and Vt denotes 
the trade volume in period t. 
Table 1.  Summary Characteristics for Each Bubble 
  Periods Peak Period Amplitude 
Trough to  
Peak Duration 
(% of episode) 
Standard 
Durationa 
(% of episode) 
Turnover 
(period 
average) 
Session  
1 
Bubble 1 5-15 9 0.41 4 (36%) 4 (36%) 4.13(0.38) 
Bubble 2 15-25 18 0.76 3(27%) 3(27%) 4.73(0.43) 
Session  
2 
Bubble 1 4-11 7 1.79 3(38%) 3(38%) 6.73(0.84) 
Bubble 2 11-25 16 2.55 5(33%) 2(13%) 3.67(0.23) 
Session  
3 
Bubble 1 1-13 9 3.30 8(62%) 8(62%) 13.47(0.96)
Bubble 2 13-25 17 3.26 4(31%) 4(31%) 7.60(0.58) 
Session  
4 
Bubble 1 1-10 8 1.06 7(64%) 8(73%) 15.07(1.37)
Bubble 2 10-25 19 1.43 9(56%) 5(31%) 13.27(0.83)
a. For the purpose of calculating duration, periods in which no trading occur are treated as 
though  prices followed a linear trend from the preceding observed price to the 
subsequent observed price. 
    
We now turn to the relationship between liquidity and bubble behavior.  Figure 2 shows the 
available cash inclusive of dividend payments in the system each period.  By design, the amount 
of cash differs across sessions due only to profit taking by generations exiting the market.  
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Therefore, available cash is the same through the first 10 periods in every session and falls in 
period 11, after the first generation exits.  It falls most (least) dramatically in session 4(1), 
indicating that generation 1 traders in that session made relatively more (less) profit than their 
counterparts in the other sessions.  The increase in cash between periods 15 and 16 was constant 
across sessions since this change reflects the cash endowment of generation 3 and the dividend 
payment after period 15.  The available cash falls again in period 21 when generation 2 exits the 
market.   
Figure 2.  Available Cash Each Period by Session 
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Figure 3 plots the average deviation of price from fundamental value in each block of 5 periods.  
This figure reveals a clear “M” shape pattern, consistent with the bubbles forming as liquidity 
enters the market and bursting as cash is removed.  Two of the four sessions fit the “M” perfectly 
and the other two are off on a single segment.  If the direction of changes in price deviation were 
random, the pattern shown in Figure 3 would only occur with probability less than 0.001.12    
                                                            
12 There are 4 price changes per session (from periods 1-5 to 6-10, from 6-10 to 11-15, etc.) and thus 24 = 16 
possible patterns for each session.  Therefore, there are 164 possible patterns that could be observed in Figure 3.  Of 
these, 1 would show an “M” pattern for all four sessions and 4C1 4C1 = (number of choices for session with 
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Figure 3.  Average Deviation of Price from Fundamental Value per 5 Period Block by Session 
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 Block of 5 Periods
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4
 
Figure 4 plots the average trade turnover per period for each block of 5 periods.  Here the pattern 
is even more consistent with changes in liquidity driving bubble behavior.  There is only a single 
segment (the change in turnover when generation 2 exits the market in Session 2) that is 
inconsistent with an “M” pattern.  If changes in turnover were random, this pattern would occur 
with probability less than 0.0003.13     
Figure 4.  Average Trade Turover per 5 Period Block by Session 
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mistake)  (ways to have one inconsistent segment out of four changes in a session) = 16 would show only a single 
segment inconsistent with an “M” pattern out of four sessions.  There are 48 ways that exactly two segments could 
be inconsistent with an “M pattern; 24 = 4C1 4C2 in which one session has two mistakes and 24 = 4C2 4C1 in 
which two sessions have one mistake each.   Therefore, there are only 48+16+1=55 out of 164 ways to observe a 
pattern at least as consistent with an “M” shape as what we observe.              
13 As in footnote 6, there are 164 possible patterns, 1 of which exactly matches an “M” pattern and 16 that match it 
except for a single segment in one of the sessions.  Thus, there are only 17 patterns that are at least as consistent with 
an “M” shape as what we observe in Figure 4.    
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Finally, we examine the one period forward price forecasts made by inactive traders.  The 
average predictions each period are shown above in Figure 1 along with the realized average 
trading price.  Casual inspection of Figure 1 suggests that people rely heavily upon the price in 
the previous period when making forecasts.  This pattern is also borne out econometrically as 
reported in Table in 2.  Specifically, we estimate a linear random effects model where the 
dependent variable is the individual’s price forecast in a given period and the independent 
variables are the average trading price in the previous and contemporaneous periods, the 
fundamental value, a dummy variable for periods when two generations are actively trading, a 
fixed effect for the individual forecaster and a random effect for each session.  
Table 2.  Estimated Price Predictions of Inactive Traders 
 
Generation 3 
pre-trading 
experience 
Generation 2 Generation 1 
post-trading 
experience 
pre-trading 
experience 
post-trading 
experience 
Forecast Periods 2-15 2-5 21-25 11-25 
Fundamental Value 
-0.162 
(0.103) 
-0.100 
(0.210) 
1.404*** 
(0.265) 
0.226** 
(0.098) 
Lagged Average Price 
0.816*** 
(0.038) 
0.959*** 
(0.199) 
1.025*** 
(0.164) 
0.899*** 
(0.054) 
Contemporaneous 
Average Price 
0.138 
(0.040) 
-0.001 
(0.125) 
-0.089 
(0.116) 
0.229*** 
(0.054) 
Two Generations Active 
-12.272 
(24.169) 
NA NA 
-54.755** 
(21.920) 
Constant 
208.295*** 
(64.910) 
86.737 
(169.96) 
-137.864** 
(62.597) 
-42.818 
(48.888) 
Observations 306 96 102 306 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Subject fixed 
effects are suppressed for brevity.   
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The econometric results in Table 2 are presented separately for each generation because their 
experiences are very different.  Generation 3 predicts prices in the first 15 periods of trading 
without the benefit of any personal trading experience whereas Generation 1 predicts prices in 
the last 15 periods of trading after acquiring market experience.  Members of Generation 2 make 
predictions both before and after their trading experience and thus we analyze their behavior 
separately each level of experience.  The results are revealing.  Both Generation 3 and 
Generation 2 before gaining trading experience rely heavily upon lagged prices, but not 
fundamental value.  However, Generation 1 and Generation 2 after gaining trading experience do 
rely upon fundamental value in addition to lagged prices.  Thus, experience leads subjects to 
anticipate that prices will reflect fundamental value.  This experience-driven change in price 
expectation helps explain why replication so consistently dampens price bubbles; trading 
experience leads people to expect that others will trade based upon fundamental value.  
Interestingly, only Generation 1 is able to anticipate price changes as evidenced by the 
significance of the contemporaneous price.                  
Conclusions 
This paper examines the role that liquidity plays in the formation and collapse of asset market 
bubbles.  As is standard in the literature, the assets in our experiments pay a known number of 
dividends from a known distribution creating a declining fundamental value pattern.  Unlike 
previous studies, we create a framework of overlapping generations where no one can hold the 
asset over its entire life, but the older generation can sell their shares to the younger generation. 
Subject comprehension of their task and of the declining fundamental dividend value structure is 
tested by a quiz at the end of the instructions. Moreover, subjects are reminded of the declining 
fundamental value by informing them what this value is during each round.       
The liquidity in our experiments varies as traders enter and exit the market, resulting in a 
repeating pattern of bubbles and busts.  As new traders bring money into the market a bubble 
forms and as exiting traders take money out of the market the bubble collapses.  Our double 
bubbles are, to the best of our knowledge, the first instance in which multiple bubbles have been 
observed in the laboratory over the life of a single asset.  Our results also provide strong 
evidence of the role liquidity plays in bubble formation.    
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When participants in our study were not actively trading, they forecast average price in the next 
period.  While each group of forecasters relied upon the observed price in the previous period, 
those who had already gained trading experience also relied upon fundamental value, but those 
who lacked trading experience did not.  That trading experience leads subjects to focus on 
fundamental value helps explain why bubbles consistently disappear with experience or are less 
likely to form with some pre-experiment training exercises.                             
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